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We look at the effect of evidence and prior beliefs on exploration, explanation and 
learning. In Experiment 1, we tested children both with and without differential prior 
beliefs about balance relationships (Center Theorists, mean: 82 months; Mass Theorists, 
mean: 89 months; No Theory children, mean: 62 months). Center and Mass Theory 
children who observed identical evidence explored the block differently depending on 
their beliefs.  When the block was balanced at its geometric center (belief-violating to a 
Mass Theorist, but belief-consistent to a Center Theorist), Mass Theory children explored 
the block more, and Center Theory children showed the standard novelty preference; 
when the block was balanced at the center of mass, the pattern of results reversed. The 
No Theory children showed a novelty preference regardless of evidence.  In Experiments 
2 and 3, we follow-up on these findings, showing that both Mass and Center Theorists 
selectively and differentially appeal to auxiliary variables (e.g., a magnet) to explain 
evidence only when their beliefs are violated.  We also show that children use the data to 
revise their predictions in the absence of the explanatory auxiliary variable but not in its 
presence.  Taken together, these results suggest that children’s learning is at once 
conservative and flexible; children integrate evidence, prior beliefs, and competing causal 
hypotheses in their exploration, explanation, and learning.  
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Theory theory  
 Many researchers have argued that science is possible because of mechanisms 
developed to support learning in early childhood (e.g. Carey 1985; Gopnik & Meltzoff, 
1997; Wellman & Gelman, 1992). This idea, the “theory theory,” suggests that children 
generate abstract, coherent, theories that (as in science) are defeasible in the face of 
counter-evidence.  The theory theory has gained considerable support from research 
suggesting that children’s early knowledge has structural and functional similarities with 
scientific theories. In particular, folk theories in early childhood support prediction, 
explanation, intervention, and counterfactual reasoning (Carey, 1985; Gopnik & 
Meltzoff, 1997; Wellman & Gelman, 1992; Carey, 2009; Murphy & Medin, 1985).   
However, theory theory also makes predictions about dynamic properties of 
theories; in particular, it predicts that children’s prior beliefs and evidence should interact 
to affect learning and exploration (Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997). These dynamic aspects of 
the analogy between science and cognitive development have been relatively less 
investigated.  The majority of research on children’s causal learning has looked not at 
how children learn from exploration but at how children learn from evidence provided by 
others (Bullock, Gelman, & Baillargeon, 1982; Chen & Klahr, 1999; Gopnik et al., 2004; 
Kushnir, Xu, & Wellman, in press; Saxe, Tenenbaum, & Carey, 2005; Schulz, Bonawitz, 
& Griffiths, 2007; Shultz, 1982; Sobel, Tenenbaum, & Gopnik, 2004; Sodian, Zaitchik, 
& Carey, 1991).  The few studies that have looked at the relationship between causal 
learning and exploration have focused on novel contexts, in which children do not have 
prior domain-specific beliefs about the competing hypotheses (Gweon & Schulz, 2008; 
Legare, Gelman, & Wellman, in press).   
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Exploration and learning in science education 
 
Exceptions to this trend are studies that have looked not at exploratory behavior 
during early childhood (when it is widely believed that play is critical to learning), but at 
exploration in school-age children as a component of formal science education.  Research 
in science education has found that self-directed exploration does little to support 
students’ learning (e.g. Dunbar & Klahr, 1989; Klahr & Nigam, 2004). Indeed, 
considerable research suggests that both children and adults have a poor metacognitive 
understanding of principles of experimental design, have difficulty designing 
informative, controlled interventions and are poor at anticipating the type of evidence that 
would support or undermine causal hypotheses (Inhelder & Piaget, 1958; Koslowski, 
1996; Kuhn, 1989; Kuhn, Amsel, & O’Laughlin, 1988; Masnick & Klahr, 2003). 
Additionally, students often fail to seek disconfirming evidence (e.g. Karmiloff-Smith & 
Inhelder, 1974; Wason, 1960) and fail to learn from disconfirming evidence when it is 
provided (e.g. Messer, Mohamedali, & Fletcher, 1996; Messer, Norgate, Joiner, Littleton, 
& Light, 1996; Nickerson, 1998). 
However, there are several reasons to think that exploratory components of formal 
science education may not be particularly informative about the nature of exploratory 
learning in early childhood. First, science education research tends to focus on students’ 
exploration of relatively complex, multivariate problems (e.g., Kuhn, 1989; Masnick & 
Klahr, 2003).  Such problems are of course appropriate as indicators of classroom 
performance, but the task complexity may lead to underestimates of children’s learning in 
simpler contexts. Second, passing tests of scientific reasoning typically requires an 
explicit, metacognitive understanding of the principles involved in causal inference and 
experimental design; this understanding is presumably absent in early childhood and may 
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well be the exclusive purview of formal education.  Finally, science education research 
often pits children’s folk theories against statistical evidence; children are typically 
credited with “success” only insofar as they suspend their prior beliefs and reason 
exclusively from the statistical data (e.g. Dunbar & Klahr, 1989; Klahr & Nigam, 2004; 
Inhelder & Piaget, 1958; Kuhn, 1989; Kuhn et al., 1988). Everyday inference however, 
typically requires integrating prior beliefs and evidence.  Considerable research suggests 
that even preschool children are capable of accurate causal judgments of this nature (see 
e.g., Schulz et al., 2007; Kushnir & Gopnik, 2007; Schulz & Gopnik, 2004; Sobel & 
Munro, 2009).  
Bayesian inference models and ambiguous evidence 
 
Bayesian inference is one approach that describes how statistical evidence 
interacts with domain-specific theories, and an increasing number of studies have argued 
that people act in ways consistent with optimal Bayeisan inference (Goodman, Feldman, 
Tenenbaum, & Griffiths, 2008; Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 2009; Kording & Wolpert, 2004; 
Weiss, Simoncelli, & Adelson, 2002; Xu & Tenenbaum, 2007).  Bayesian inference 
indicates how the learner updates her beliefs about a set of hypotheses following the data.  
The learner begins with different degrees of belief about the truth of the these hypotheses, 
known as the prior, p(h).  The probability of any particular hypothesis, h, given some 
observed data, d, is the posterior, p(h|d).  Bayes rule tells us that p(h|d)∝p(d|h)p(h), where 
p(d|h), the likelihood, is the probability of observing the data if h were true.  
The details of Bayesian inference will not be critical here.  However, we 
emphasize the framework because it provides an intuitive account of how prior beliefs 
and evidence might interact to affect curiosity and exploration.  In particular the learner 
will be uncertain about the causal structure of an event if the posterior probability of two 
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or more hypotheses is roughly equivalent: p(h1|d) ≈ p(h2|d).  This could occur in two 
ways: (1) if hypotheses are both a priori equally likely and also both equally likely to 
have generated the observed data (i.e., evidence is confounded); (2) if data provides 
strong support for a hypothesis whose prior probability (given the learner’s current 
theory) is low (i.e., evidence violates the learner’s expectations) and weak support for a 
hypothesis whose prior probability is high. We suggest that cases where a small number 
of hypotheses have equivalent posterior probabilities should promote curiosity and 
exploration.  One virtue of this account is that it makes it clear that the curiosity provoked 
by confounding and the curiosity provided by theory violation result from a common 
inferential process that generates equivalent outcomes: competing posterior probabilities 
among hypotheses.  
Previous work (Schulz & Bonawitz, 2007) has shown that, given a familiar toy 
with multiple a priori equally plausible causal structures, children are more likely to 
continue exploring it (rather than a novel toy) when evidence is confounded than when 
evidence is unconfounded (see also Gweon & Schulz, 2008). That is, children engage in 
selective exploration when the prior probability of competing hypotheses and the 
likelihood of the evidence under the hypotheses are matched (Cook, Goodman, & Schulz, 
2011; Gweon & Schulz, 2008; Schulz & Bonawitz, 2007). Here we investigate the other 
case of ambiguity: whether children show different patterns of exploratory play when 
they observe identical evidence but have different prior beliefs.   Put formally, the current 
study looks at whether children engage in selective exploration when the prior probability 
of hypothesis A is greater than hypothesis B but hypothesis A is less likely given the 
evidence than hypothesis B.  
Exploration and learning in early childhood 
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The basic premise, that children will attend more to belief-violating than belief-
consistent evidence, is of course not new: indeed, it is central to violation-of-expectation 
paradigms in infancy. Strikingly however, such paradigms have rarely been extended 
through early and middle childhood. Although both classic and contemporary research 
have provided elegant accounts of children’s exploratory play, the vast majority of this 
work has been descriptive rather than experimental (Berlyne, 1969; Bruner, Jolly, & 
Sylva, 1976; Hutt & Bhavnani, 1972; Piaget, 1962; Power, 2000; Rubin, Fein, & 
Vandenber, 1983; Singer, Golinkoff, & Hirsh-Pasek, 2006). Thus relatively little is 
known about the exploratory behavior of older children. Critically, exploratory play 
allows children to access different kinds of information than they could get merely 
through visual inspection; in particular, active exploration might allow children to 
discover otherwise hidden, but potentially explanatory, variables. Thus a second 
consideration of the current work is whether children identify hidden variables in the 
course of exploration and if so, how the discovery of auxiliary variables interacts with 
children’s prior beliefs to affect learning. 
Children’s beliefs about balance relationships 
Looking at instances of theory violation requires looking at a domain in which 
children have well-defined prior beliefs. For this purpose, we focus the current 
investigation on children’s beliefs about balance relationships.  We chose this domain 
both because children’s beliefs about balance have been well established by prior 
research (e.g., Karmiloff-Smith & Inhelder, 1974; Case, 1985; Halford et al., 2002; 
Jansen & van der Maas, 2002; McClelland, 1989; McClelland, 1995; Normandeau, 
Larivee, Roulin, & Longeot, 1989; Shultz & Takane, 2007; Siegler, 1976; Siegler & 
Chen, 1998; Siegler & Chen, 2002; Pine & Messer, 2000; Raijmakers, van Koten, & 
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Molenaar, 1996) and because balancing blocks are natural and accessible stimuli for 
exploratory play.  
Our research takes off from a seminal study looking at children’s folk theories of 
balance (Karmiloff-Smith & Inhelder, 1974). Karmiloff-Smith and Inhelder (1974) 
showed that children younger than six ("No Theory1" children) balance blocks by trial 
and error and are thus equally successful (after several attempts) in balancing blocks 
whether the blocks are symmetrically or asymmetrically weighted.  Around age six, 
children develop a “Center Theory” and believe that blocks will balance if the point of 
balance bisects the base of the block.  These children succeed even on a first attempt at 
balancing symmetric blocks but fail, even after repeated attempts, with asymmetric 
blocks.  They perseverate on the block’s geometric center and are reluctant to adjust 
towards the center of mass.  Thus older “Center Theorists” can take longer to balance an 
asymmetric block than younger “No Theory” children.  Still older children (seven- and 
eight-year-olds) accurately consider the distribution of weight (“Mass Theory”) and are 
likely to succeed, even on their first attempt, at both symmetrically and asymmetrically 
weighted blocks. 
Children’s understanding of balance has subsequently been investigated by many 
researchers.  These studies have typically focused on transitions in children’s use of rules 
and strategies in balance scale tasks (e.g. Case, 1985; Halford, Andrews, Dalton, Boag, & 
Zielinski, 2002; Jansen & van der Maas, 2002; Normandeau et al., 1989; Siegler, 1976; 
Siegler & Chen, 1998; Siegler & Chen, 2002; Pine & Messer, 2000; Raijmakers et al., 
1996).  Consistent with the Karmiloff-Smith and Inhelder (1974) study, such research 
                                                
1 Because we used the Karmiloff-Smith and Inhelder (1974) study as a starting point, we adopt their 
practice of referring to the children’s beliefs about balance relations as “theories”.  However, we recognize 
that folk theories of physics, psychology, and biology (see e.g., Carey, 1985; Wellman & Gelman, 1992) 
call on a richer, more integrated set of beliefs than the balance relationships we investigate here. 
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shows a consistent progression in children’s ability to consider both weight and distance 
relations in predicting the outcome of balance relations (e.g., from initially considering 
both variables only when a single variable fails to distinguish the outcome to gradually 
integrating the two variables).  Various formal accounts (see e.g., McClelland, 1989; 
McClelland, 1995; Shultz & Takane, 2007) have been advanced to explain the periods of 
stability and transition in children’s rule use.2 
Theories, evidence, and exploration 
 The current work is distinct from this tradition.  We do not focus either on the 
particular content of children’s domain-specific beliefs or on transitions in children’s 
domain-general ability to integrate information across multiple variables.   Rather, we use 
children’s beliefs about balance as a content domain in which children’s beliefs might 
affect exploration and learning.  That is, here we look at whether children’s prior beliefs 
affect the actions they take, the evidence they get as a result, and children’s responses to 
that evidence (in particular, whether they learn from the evidence or try to explain it 
away).  
 Note that although some research traditions emphasize children’s ability to 
engage in flexible associative learning from data (with and without feedback; Gruen & 
Weir, 1964; Weir, 1964; Weir & Stevenson, 1959), other research stresses children’s 
difficulty with belief revision and learners’ tendency to misrepresent evidence that 
                                                
2 Infancy research has also looked at children’s beliefs about balance relations, showing that over the first 
year of life, infants come to understand that the continuous proportion of the bottom surface left 
unsupported predicts whether an object will fall or remain supported (i.e., infants will accept that an object 
can be supported by a small support in the middle, like a “T” but will reject a small support at one end, “Γ”; 
Needham & Baillargeon, 1993). However, in these cases infants do not need to consider either the relative 
proportion of unsupported area on either side of a point of balance (as required even for Center Theory) or 
the distribution of weight as required in traditional balance scale tasks.  Indeed, in the one experiment 
involving asymmetric objects (triangles) infants failed to look longer at impossible events (Baillargeon & 
Hanko-Summers, 1990). Thus, the infancy research is not in tension with the Karmiloff-Smith and Inhelder 
results. 
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conflicts with strongly held beliefs (see e.g. Lord, Ros, & Lepper, 1979; Kuhn et al., 
1988; Dunbar & Klahr, 1989; Schauble, 1990; Sloutsky & Spino, 2004). Indeed, some 
studies suggest that learners may recall evidence better and give it more weight when 
they are not committed to particular theories than when they are (Cooper, 1981; Hastie & 
Kumar, 1979; Wright & Murphy, 1984). One advantage of the theory theory approach is 
that it predicts both flexibility and intransigence in children’s learning. Theory theory 
suggests that learners’ sensitivity to evidence, including their tendency to accurately 
represent or explain away data, depends on how evidence (including the availability of 
auxiliary explanatory variables) is integrated into children’s prior knowledge.    
 Here we predict that children’s prior beliefs and evidence should interact to affect 
children’s behavior in three respects.  First, consistent with the qualitative predictions of 
our Bayesian analysis of ambiguity, we predict that, given identical evidence, children 
with different prior beliefs about the evidence will show different patterns of exploratory 
behavior. Second, we predict that children will be sensitive to discoveries they make in 
the course of exploration that might explain away belief-violating evidence.  Even if a 
given variable suffices to explain all the observed evidence, we predict that children will 
selectively appeal to the variable to explain belief-inconsistent but not belief-consistent 
evidence. In this respect we suggest that children’s beliefs are resistant to anomalous 
data. Finally, we predict that if children’s exploration fails to uncover factors that might 
explain away belief-violating evidence, children will make new generalizations that are 
consistent with the evidence rather than with their prior beliefs.  That is, if the evidence 
cannot be explained away, children will learn from it.  Such empirical generalizations 
may not themselves be tantamount to belief-revision but could help lay the groundwork 
for later theory-change.  
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In the following studies, we investigate the effect of evidence and prior beliefs on 
children’s exploration, explanation, and learning using a paradigm similar to Schulz and 
Bonawitz (2007). We familiarize children with an asymmetrically weighted block and 
then balance the block in a manner consistent with, or in violation of, their prior beliefs.  
We also introduce a novel distracter toy.  We compare children’s relative interest in 
exploring the balance relationship against their interest in exploring the new toy.3 We 
predict that children’s relative interest in the balancing block will be mediated by their 
prior beliefs such that they explore the block more when the evidence is inconsistent with 
their beliefs.  A magnet actually holds the block in position in all cases, and the magnet 
is, of course, always a sufficient explanation for why the block “stays up.” We expect the 
majority of children (in all conditions) to discover the magnet, but we expect children to 
explain the evidence by referring to the magnet more often in belief-violating than in 
belief-consistent conditions.  Finally, we look at the conditions under which children 
learn from their exploration.  
Experiment 1 
Methods 
Participants. Ninety-five six- and-seven-year-olds (M = 84 months; range = 73-
97 months) and thirty-one four- and-five-year-olds (M = 62 months; range = 51-68 
months) were recruited from a local urban science museum. Two six-year-olds and two 
five-year-olds were dropped from the study and replaced due to parental interference; one 
                                                
3 We pit the balanced block against a closely matched novel toy (rather than directly comparing children’s 
play with two blocks balanced in different ways) in order to assess whether the evidence induces causal 
uncertainty in itself, rather than only relative to an explicitly presented alternative. This methodological 
advantage, rather than theoretical considerations, motivates this comparison. That is, we believe that it is 
rational for children to explore novel stimuli; we only suggest that given stimuli otherwise well-matched 
for salience, children can override novelty preferences to explore evidence that induces causal uncertainty. 
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six-year-old was dropped and replaced because he failed the initial familiarization. An 
additional 35 six- and-seven-year-olds participated in the belief classification task but 
were not included in additional analyses due to ambiguous belief classification.  (See 
below.) Approximately equal number of boys and girls participated (46% girls). 
Materials.  A total of nine asymmetric blocks, made of Styrofoam and colored 
tape were used: four (each unique in color and shape) were used for the belief 
classification task; three blue blocks (identical to each other), were used for 
familiarization, and two blue test blocks (identical to the familiarization blocks but 
containing a magnet either at their geometric center or center of mass) were used in the 
test condition. The base for the balancing blocks was a rod inserted into a rectangular 
wooden platform. The novel toy was a metal key ring with several charms; the ring was 
placed on platform similar to those of the balances. See Figure 1.  An opaque bag was 
used to cover the novel toy. 
Procedure. 
 Belief-classification. The experiment began with a belief-classification task.  
Children were presented with three of the four classification blocks (chosen at random) 
and were asked to try to balance each block on the post.  The experimenter watched to 
see whether the child attempted to balance the block at its geometric center or towards 
the center of mass. The experimenter took hold of the block just as the child set it on the 
post so that children never observed the outcome of their balancing attempts.  
 Familiarization. The experimenter then set aside the balancing post and 
introduced the children to the three familiarization blue blocks, one at a time.  Children 
were encouraged to explore each of the blocks and were asked to point to the heavier side 
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of each block.  Throughout the classification and familiarization periods, the novel toy 
was on the table, covered and off to the side, out of the child’s view.  
Play. Children were assigned (randomly or pseudo-randomly; see below) to a 
Geometric Center or Center of Mass condition.  The experimenter said, “I’m going to try 
to balance my block here very carefully,” and ‘balanced’ the test block (helped by the 
magnet) either in the geometric center of the block or over the center of mass. The 
experimenter then uncovered the novel toy and placed both the balanced block and the 
novel toy within the child’s reach, approximately equidistant from the child. She told the 
child, “Go ahead and play with which ever toy you want until I come back.” The 
instructions were designed to discourage simultaneous play with both toys to facilitate 
coding. However, coders looked separately at time with each toy, thus simultaneous play 
was credited to both of the toys.  The base and block of the balance could be separated, 
and the novel toy ring and platform could also be separated. Play with either part of the 
balance was considered play with the balance, and play with either part of the novel toy is 
referred to as play with the novel toy. Children were given one minute to play.   
Explanation. After 60 seconds, the experimenter returned to the table and 
covered up the novel toy.  She returned the test block to its original balanced position and 
asked, “Can you tell me, why is this block staying straight? How come it’s not tipping 
over?”   If a child responded, “I don’t know” she was prompted: “It’s okay to take a 
guess, how come it stays up like this and isn’t tipping over?” 
Final Prediction. Following the child’s explanation, the experimenter removed 
the blue block and presented the fourth classification block to the child asking: “Can you 
balance this very carefully for me, so that it does not tip over?” 
Results and Discussion 
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Belief Classification.  Consistent with the previous research by Karmiloff-Smith 
and Inhelder (1974), and corroborated by the current findings (see analysis to follow), all 
of the four and five-year-olds were classified as “No Theory” children.4  The six- and 
seven-year-old children were classified as “Center Theorists” or “Mass Theorists” based 
on where they attempted to balance the classification block on all three of the trials; older 
children who produced inconsistent balance attempts were dropped from further analyses. 
All attempts within 1” of the geometric center of the block (a 10% margin of error) were 
classified as Center balances. All balances outside of this margin of error and towards the 
heavy side of the block were coded as Mass balances.  Children’s initial predictions were 
coded by a research assistant blind to hypotheses and conditions, and 88% were 
reliability coded by a second researcher blind to condition; reliability was high (Kappa = 
.94)5.   
 Consistent with previous research (Karmiloff-Smith & Inhelder, 1974), the initial 
predictions of the four- and-five-year-olds were quite variable: 65% of the children split 
their responses between the geometric center and the center of mass predictions on the 
three classification trials (i.e., they gave one response on two of the trials and a different 
response on a third).  Additionally, 34% of the children made at least one balance attempt 
that was towards the lighter end of the block and thus inconsistent with both Center 
Theory and Mass Theory.  
                                                
4 “No Theory” here is shorthand for no differential theory favoring the geometric center or center of mass.  
The younger children do of course have some theories relevant to balance relations (e.g., that the block 
must be supported from below).  
 
5 To ensure children in the older group were theory-consistent, a third researcher, blind to hypotheses and 
condition served as “tie-breaker” for the few responses in which there was balance classification 
disagreement between coders. 
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 By contrast, the older children showed somewhat more systematic patterns: none 
of the older children ever attempted to balance the block towards the lighter side, and 
63% of the children consistently balanced the blocks on all three trials. Because the older 
children who performed inconsistently could not be readily distinguished from the No 
Theory children, they were dropped from further analysis.  Of the 60 children who 
balanced consistently on all three classification trials, 32 were classified as Center 
Theorists, and 28 were classified as Mass Theorists.  Consistent with Karmiloff-Smith 
and Inhelder’s (1974) original findings, the Center Theorists (M = 81 months) were 
younger than the Mass Theorists (M = 88 months; t(58) = 4.9, p < .0001).  
Play.  The No Theory children were randomly assigned to a Geometric Center 
condition (n = 16) or a Center of Mass condition (n = 15). There were no age differences 
between conditions (Geometric Center mean age = 62.0 months; Center of Mass mean 
age = 62.8 months; t(29) = 0.43, p = ns).  In order to match the number of children in 
each cell, Center Theorists and Mass Theorists were pseudo-randomly assigned to the 
two conditions.  The child’s theory classification was ultimately determined by coding 
the classification task from videotape; however, the experimenter used the child’s 
performance during the classification task to make her best guess about the child’s 
ultimate classification.  The experimenter’s online judgment was consistent with the 
videotape classification in all cases.  Within each classification, children were then 
randomly assigned to either the Geometric Center or Center of Mass condition, resulting 
in 16 Center Theorists (M = 80.3) and 14 Mass Theorists (M = 90.6) in the Geometric 
Center condition and 16 Center Theorists (M = 80.8) and 14 Mass Theorists (M = 86.2) 
in the Center of Mass condition.  Center Theory children were matched for age between 
conditions (t(30) = 0.76, p = ns) as were the Mass Theory children (t(26) = 1.7, p = ns).  
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 Children were counted as playing with the toys as long as they were actively 
engaged with the toys6; two coders blind to condition and hypotheses coded the total 
amount of time each child7 played with each toy (reliability was high; Balance Toy: r2 = 
.96, Novel Toy: r2 = .97). We analyzed children’s play by looking at children’s mean 
length of the play with the balance and block.  Additionally, we looked at whether 
children discovered the magnet in the course of free play.  The magnet was not visible, 
but pilot work suggested that its force was strong enough that it could be readily felt 
whenever the block was pulled from the stand.  Thus, children were counted as 
discovering the magnet if during the play period, they pulled the block from the stand at 
the point where it was held in place by the magnet.   
Play Results for Four- and Five-Year-old “No Theory” Children. We compared 
how long the children played with each toy in each condition by doing a 2 x 2 mixed 
ANOVA with play time on each toy as the within-subjects variable and condition as the 
between-subjects variable. Two-tailed tests are used throughout.  For the four- and five-
year-old “No Theory” children, comparisons between the Geometric Center condition 
and Center of Mass condition revealed a main effect of toy type (averaging across the 
two conditions, children significantly preferred the novel toy over the balance toy, (F(1, 
29) = 9.43, p < .01)), but no main effect of condition (overall, children played for the 
same amount of time in each condition (F(1, 29) = 0, p = ns)) and no interaction (F(1, 
29) = .03, p = ns). This preference for the novel toy held up by condition: children were 
                                                
6 Coders were asked to use their intuitions about what constituted active engagement throughout.  For 
example, if the child’s hand was limply resting on the balance toy while they were clearly looking at and 
touching the novel toy with their other hand, the balance toy was not credited with play, and the novel toy 
was counted.  Alternatively, for instance, if a child used the block from the balance toy to build a structure 
with the novel toy, play was counted towards both objects.   
7 Two of the 93 children who participated were unable to be reliability coded for play due to technical 
malfunction of the recordings. 
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more likely to play with the novel toy than the balance in the Geometric Center condition 
(t(15) = 1.88, p < .05) and marginally more likely in the Center of Mass condition  (t(14) 
= 1.64, p = .06). In both conditions, a non-significant majority of children played most 
with the novel toy. See Table 1. 
There were no other differences between conditions. Children spent the same 
amount of time playing with the balance toy in the Geometric Center condition as in the 
Center of Mass condition (t(29) = .17, p = ns). Additionally, individual children were no 
more likely to prefer the balance toy in the Geometric Center condition than in the Center 
of Mass condition, (Fisher Exact (N = 31) = ns). Finally, 63% of children in the 
Geometric Center condition and 60% of children in the Center of Mass condition were 
coded as discovering the magnet, (Fisher Exact (N = 31) = ns). 
Play Results for Six- and Seven-Year-old “Center Theory” and “Mass Theory” 
Children.  As predicted, children were more likely to explore the balance and block when 
the evidence conflicted with their beliefs than when it confirmed their beliefs (see Figure 
2 (a), Table 2). To compare the amount of time playing with the blocks, we ran a two-
way-between subjects ANOVA with theory and type of evidence as the between subjects 
variables and time spent playing with the blocks as the dependent measure. Comparisons 
between conditions revealed no main effect of theory (averaging across the two 
conditions, Center Theorists and Mass Theorists played for equal amounts of time) and 
no main effect of evidence type (averaging across the two conditions by theory type, 
children who saw the block balancing at the geometric center played as long as children 
who saw the block balancing at the center of mass). However, comparisons revealed a 
significant interaction: children spent more time playing with the block when the 
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evidence conflicted with their theories than when the evidence confirmed their theories 
(F(1, 59) = 6.02, p < .05).   
Within the Geometric Center condition, Center Theory children played equally 
long with both toys (t(15) = 0.71, p = ns), whereas Mass Theory children played 
significantly longer with the balancing block than the novel toy (t(13) = 2.48, p < .05).  
Within the Center of Mass condition, Center Theorists played longer with the balancing 
block than the novel toy (t(15) = 2.47, p < .05), whereas Mass Theorists play equally long 
with both toys (t(13) = 0.49, p = ns).  We also analyzed whether more children were more 
likely to play with the novel toy or the balancing block using a log-linear analysis on 
theory by condition by toy type. Children were more likely to prefer the block to the 
novel toy when evidence conflicted with beliefs than when it confirmed them (G2(2) = 
6.12, p < .05).  
Finally, we looked at children’s tendency to discover the magnet by belief and 
condition: 75% of Center Theorists and 100% of Mass Theorists discovered the magnet 
in the Geometric Center condition; 94% of Center Theorists and 86% of Mass Theorists 
discovered the magnet in the Center of Mass condition.  There were no differences 
between any of these conditions or groups, (Fisher exact (N = 60) = ns). 
Explanation.  All children generated a single explanation, and their explanations 
uniquely and unambiguously fell into one of four mutually exclusive categories: children 
who generated Center Theory-consistent explanations (e.g. “It balances because it’s in 
the middle; there’s the same length on both sides”); children who generated Mass 
Theory-consistent explanations, (e.g.. “There’s equal amount of weight on both sides”); 
children who appealed to the hidden cause, the magnet, (e.g. “There’s something sticky 
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there holding it up, like a magnet”); or children who provided Uninformative 
explanations (e.g. “It’s flat”; “You balanced it slowly and carefully”).   
Explanation Results for Four and Five-Year-old, “No Theory” Children.  The 
majority (52%) of the No Theory children gave Uninformative explanations8. Of the 
remaining children, 3% were coded as providing Center-consistent explanations; 16% as 
Mass-consistent, and 29% as appealing to the magnet.  Comparing the Geometric Center 
and Center of Mass conditions, children were equally likely to appeal to each explanation 
type (Fisher Exact, (N = 31) p = ns, see Table 1).  In particular, comparing children who 
generated just magnet explanations to children who generated all other explanations did 
not reveal any differences among the conditions, (Fisher Exact (N = 31) = ns); see Table 
1.  
Explanation Results for Six and Seven-Year-old, “Center Theory” and “Mass 
Theory” Children.  Comparing children’s explanations across conditions and theory type 
revealed a significant interaction χ2(9, N = 60) = 17.8, p < .05, (see Table 1).  This was 
driven by two factors.  First, Mass Theorists were marginally more likely to appeal to a 
Mass consistent explanation (50% of their explanations) than were Center Theorists (25% 
of their explanations; (Fisher Exact (N = 60) = .06).  There were no other differences 
between Mass and Center theorists collapsing by condition. See Table 2. 
 The second factor driving the interaction is that Mass theorists in the two 
conditions differentially appealed to the magnet. Counter to our predictions, the Center 
Theorists were equally likely to appeal to the magnet as the explanatory variable in both 
conditions (Geometric Center: 50%; Center of Mass: 56%; Fisher Exact (N = 32) = ns). 
                                                
8 One child in the Center of Mass condition responded, “I don’t know”, which was also coded as 
uninformative. 
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Consistent with our predictions, however, the Mass Theorists were significantly more 
likely to appeal to the magnet in the Geometric Center condition (71%) than the Center 
of Mass condition (14%), (Fisher Exact (N = 28) < .01). See Figure 3(a).  
Final Prediction.  Children’s final balance attempts were coded as Center 
consistent, Mass consistent, or Other.  A research assistant blind to hypotheses and 
conditions coded children’s final predictions and 81% of the clips were reliability coded 
by a second researcher; reliability was perfect (Kappa = 1).  
Final Prediction Results for Four and Five-Year-old, “No Theory” Children.  
Consistent with Karmiloff-Smith and Inhelder’s finding that even after a relatively short 
play period, younger children can move from ‘No Theory’ to ‘Center Theory’, the 
majority of final predictive balances were consistent with the Center Theory prediction 
(83%). This was greater than the proportion predicted by children’s initial belief 
classification balances (69%), (Binomial, p = .05).  The move to Center Theory 
consistent balances seemed to be driven by the evidence that children 
observed: marginally more children made a Center-consistent final balance prediction in 
the Geometric Center condition (93%) than in the Center of Mass condition (67%), 
(Fisher Exact, (N = 31) p = .08); see Table 1. 
Final Prediction Results for Six and Seven-Year-old Center Theory and Mass 
Theory Children.  Overall, children who received evidence consistent with their initial 
beliefs (Center Theory children in the Geometric Center condition and Mass Theory 
children in the Center of Mass condition) showed remarkable consistency between their 
initial classification and final predictions.  Only one child of the 30 (3%) changed 
predictions after observing belief-consistent evidence.  In contrast, 11 of the 30 children 
(37%) changed predictions on the final balance attempt after observing evidence 
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contrasting with their initial beliefs (Center Theory children in the Center of Mass 
condition and Mass Theory children in the Geometric Center condition), (Fisher Exact (N 
= 60) < .01). These results held up within theory type: Center Theorists in the Center of 
Mass condition were significantly more likely than Center Theorists in the Geometric 
Center condition to make a correct mass-consistent prediction on the final balance 
attempt, (Fisher Exact (N = 60), p < .05) and Mass Theorists in the Geometric Center 
condition were marginally more likely than Mass Theorists in the Center of Mass 
condition to make mass-inconsistent balances (center or other) on the final balance 
attempt, (Fisher Exact (N = 60), p = .08); see Table 2. 
Discussion 
The exploratory play data for the four-and-five-year-old “No Theory” children 
support the well established finding that children preferentially explore novel objects 
over familiar ones. They also support the idea that these children do not have strong 
(evidence differentiating) beliefs about balance. Contrasting these results with those of 
the six-and-seven-year-old children suggests the influence that children’s beliefs can have 
in overcoming a preference for stimulus novelty. Not only did the older children have 
different beliefs, their beliefs shaped their choices in play.  The Center and Mass Theory 
children were only a few months apart in age (e.g., could all have been in the same 
classroom) and, within condition, observed the very same stimuli.   Nonetheless, the 
children systematically differed in their play behavior: given identical evidence, six-and-
seven-year-olds showed distinctive patterns of exploratory play depending on their prior 
theories. 
Because the magnet was easy to discover, children’s different patterns of 
exploration did not make them any more or less likely to discover the magnet.  As 
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predicted however, the children were not equally likely to appeal to the magnet as an 
explanatory variable in all conditions: Mass Theorists were more likely to invoke the 
magnet when the block balanced at the Geometric Center than when it balanced at the 
Center of Mass.  Indeed, of the five Mass Theorists who did not appeal to the magnet in 
the Geometric Center condition, four tried to explain away the surprising data in other 
ways, including questioning the evidence of their own senses (“Even though this side is 
smaller, it must weigh the same”; “If this is the middle, it must weigh the same on both 
sides somehow”; “Maybe this heavier side (pointing to the geometric center) is actually 
closer”). Such responses suggest that children are relatively conservative about 
abandoning their prior beliefs when faced with apparent counter-evidence evidence.    
The responses of the Center Theorists however, violated our own predictions: 
they were no more likely to appeal to the magnet given belief-violating evidence than 
belief-consistent evidence.  One possibility is that the slightly younger Center Theorists 
were more excited by the discovery of the magnet during free play, and thus had more 
difficulty inhibiting reference to it during the explanation phase.  A second possibility is 
that the younger children had slightly more fragile explanatory abilities than the older 
children and thus found it easier to mention the magnet than to construct a response in 
terms of their prior beliefs (e.g., “Because the block is in the center of the post.”). We 
follow-up these possibilities in Experiment 2. 
Experiment 2 
In Experiment 1, the Mass Theorists selectively appealed to alternative 
explanatory variables given theory-violating evidence but the slightly younger Center 
Theorists did not.  As discussed, this might be due to the demands of inhibiting a salient 
alternative variable. We hypothesized that if children were made aware that magnets 
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might be present but did not spontaneously discover the magnets themselves, the impulse 
to refer to the magnet across the board would be reduced.  We also hypothesized that 
children’s explanations might be more selective if they had an opportunity to practice 
giving explanations over the course of the experiment. Finally, we removed the 
possibility that Center Theorists’ explanations might be affected by belief revision in the 
course of the experiment itself.  In Experiment 2, we look at whether Center Theorists 
selectively appeal to auxiliary variables in the face of anomalous evidence under these 
task conditions. 
Methods 
Participants.  Fifty-one six-and-seven-year-olds were recruited from a local 
science museum. Eight children were classified as Mass Theorists (see below) and were 
not included in these analyses and eleven children were dropped and replaced for failing 
to balance the block at the geometric center on all three familiarization trials. The 
remaining 32 Center Theory children (mean = 83 months; range = 72 – 97 months) were 
randomly assigned to a Geometric Center (16 children) or Center of Mass condition (16 
children). Equal number of boys and girls participated (50% girls). 
Materials.  The materials were identical to those used in Experiment 1 except that 
a third blue test block (identical to the previous two but without any magnets) was also 
used.  Additionally, three sets of warm-up toys were used: 2 bells (identical except that 
one made noise and one did not); 2 small toy cars (one that rolled and one that did not); 
and 2 identical 1” cubes (one magnetic and one not).  Three paper clips were also used. 
Procedure. 
 Belief Classification Task. The Classification task was identical to Experiment 1.  
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Warm-up Task. Children were given a warm-up task to help them practice 
generating explanations and to familiarize them with magnets.  First, the experimenter 
brought out the bells and showed children that one bell rang but the other did not.  The 
experimenter asked the child “Why do you think this bell rings and this one doesn’t?” If 
the child offered an explanation the experimenter moved on to the toy cars.  If the child 
could not explain the evidence, the experimenter prompted the child: “Can you come up 
with any ideas for why this bell works and this one doesn’t?”  If the child still failed to 
answer, the experimenter said, “Maybe it’s because this one does not have the clapper 
and this one does.  Or maybe because the clapper in this one is stuck.”  The child was 
then shown that one toy car rolled and one toy car did not and was asked “Why do you 
think this one rolls and this one does not?”  Again, if children generated an explanation, 
the experimenter moved on (to the magnets warm-up); if not the child was again 
prompted and finally provided with feedback: “Maybe it’s because the bottom of the car 
is sticky. Or maybe because the wheels are glued so that they can’t spin.” 
In the last warm-up task, children were shown the two cubes and the clips.  One 
cube attracted the clips; the other did not. Children were told, “See how this block picks 
up the clips and this one does not? That because this block has a magnet in it which 
makes the clips stick.  This one doesn’t. I’m going to put the magnet block over here (to 
the right) and the non-magnet block over here (to the left)”.  The experimenter then 
brought out two of the blue test blocks (the inert one and one which had a magnet). The 
experimenter demonstrated that one of the test blocks picked up the clips and the other 
did not.  The experimenter asked, “Can you tell me which block has a magnet in it and 
which does not have a magnet in it?” After the child correctly identified the magnetic and 
non-magnetic blocks, the experimenter asked the child to sort the blocks; a correct 
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response involved placing the magnetic block with the magnetic cube (to the right) and 
the inert block with the inert cube (to the left).  The magnetic and inert object piles 
remained on the right and left of the table for the remainder of the experiment. 
Test Phase. The experimenter pulled out the third blue test block and showed it to 
the child, asking “Can you show me, which is the big, heavy side and which is the light 
side?”  The experimenter then carefully ‘balanced’ the block on the stand for the child. 
(As in Experiment 1, in both conditions, the block was held in place by the magnet).  Half 
the children saw the block balancing at the geometric center (Geometric Center 
condition) and half balancing at the center of mass (Center of Mass condition).  Children 
were then asked for an explanation: “Can you tell me, why is this block staying up? How 
come it’s not falling over?”  Following the child’s explanation, the experimenter asked 
the child “Can you tell me, which group do you think this belongs in? The group with the 
magnetic blocks or the group that is not magnetic?”  
Results and Discussion 
Children’s initial prediction results were coded as in Experiment 1. Only children 
balancing the block at the geometric center on all three classification trials were included 
(74% of those tested). Children’s initial predictions were coded by a research assistant 
blind to hypotheses and conditions and 88% of the clips were reliability coded by a 
second researcher; reliability was high (96% agreement9). Sixteen Center Theorists were 
randomly assigned to the Geometric Center condition, and 16 to the Center of Mass 
condition. There were no age differences between conditions (Geometric Center mean 
age: 82.2 months; Center of Mass mean age: 84.6 months; t(30) = 0.88, p = ns).  All 
                                                
9 Because virtually all of the responses fell into a single category (center balances) we report the overall 
correlation; Kappa is not appropriate given the distribution of the data. 
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children successfully generated explanations in the warm-up tasks and successfully sorted 
the magnetic and nonmagnetic cubes and test blocks. Children provided a single 
explanation and children’s explanations were coded by two research assistants, blind to 
condition and hypotheses; 94% of the clips were reliability coded for explanation and 
reliability was high (Kappa = .77).   
As hypothesized, significantly more children appealed to the magnet in the Center 
of Mass condition (63%) than in the Geometric Center condition (13%), (Fisher Exact (N 
= 32) < .01; see Figure 3(b)).  Significantly more children also made a Center consistent 
explanation in the Geometric Center condition (50%), than in the Center of Mass 
condition (0%), Fisher Exact (N = 32), p < .01. There were no differences in the number 
of children who generated a Mass consistent explanation (Geometric Center: 6%; Center 
of Mass: 25%) or Uninformative explanation (Geometric Center: 31%; Center of Mass: 
13%) between conditions (Fisher Exact (N = 32), p = ns for both conditions); see Table 
3. 
 Two children in the Geometric Center condition did not complete the sorting task 
and were dropped from subsequent analyses. As predicted, and consistent with the 
explanation results, children in the Center of Mass condition were more likely than 
children in the Geometric Center condition to sort the balanced block with the magnetic 
objects.  In the Center of Mass condition the majority of children (81%) classified the 
block as magnetic; significantly fewer of the children (36%) did so in the Geometric 
Center condition, (Fisher Exact (N = 30) = .01); see Table 3.  
 The results of Experiment 2, together with the performance of the Mass Theorists 
in Experiment 1, suggest that children selectively explain away surprising evidence by 
appealing to hidden variables.  Even though the magnets were present throughout, 
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children appealed to the alternative explanatory variable in belief-violating but not belief-
consistent conditions. Children’s ability to invoke hidden variables to explain away 
belief-violating evidence suggests a rational process by which children might maintain 
their beliefs in the face of apparent counter-evidence.  One paradoxical implication of 
these results is that in some contexts, reducing children’s physical engagement in play 
(see e.g., Bjorklund & Brown, 2008; Pelligrini & Smith, 1998), and thus reducing the 
salience of auxiliary variables, can improve children’s inferential reasoning, allowing 
them to make more selective judgments about the causal explanatory role of these 
variables.    
Experiment 3 
 In Experiment 3, we look at what children might be capable of learning from 
evidence generated in exploratory play if no auxiliary variables are provided.  We 
replicate the procedure of Experiment 1 but never give children a chance to observe 
evidence they can explain away.  To do this, we test Center Theorists using two new 
asymmetric blocks.  (We test Center Theorists and not Mass Theorists to avoid 
deceptively teaching children an incorrect theory of balance.)  One block only balances 
over its center of mass (e.g., like any asymmetrically weighted block) and one balances 
only over the geometric center (because it is surreptitiously weighted so that although one 
end looks heavier, the center of mass is in the middle of the block).  In neither case is a 
magnet involved in the balancing.  Thus, regardless of what actions children take during 
play, they can only generate evidence consistent with their condition: in the Geometric 
Center condition the block balances only at the geometric center; in the Center of Mass 
condition the block balances only at the center of mass.   
Methods 
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Participants.  Thirty-two six and seven-year-olds (mean = 84 months; range = 74 
to 94 months) were recruited from a local urban area science museum. An additional nine 
children were dropped and replaced for failing to balance the block at the geometric 
center on all three familiarization trials; one child in the Geometric Center condition was 
dropped and replaced for failure to interact with the stimuli during the play period. 
Children were randomly assigned to either the Geometric Center condition (n = 16) or a 
Center of Mass condition (n = 16). Equal number of boys and girls participated (50% 
girls). 
Materials.  The materials were identical to Experiment 1, except that the magnet 
was placed at the top surface of the block, so that it would not interfere with balancing 
and could not be used to explain away surprising evidence. The test block for the 
Geometric Center condition was surreptitiously weighed so that although it looked 
heavier on one side, it actually balanced over its geometric center. Additionally, 6 new 
colored blocks, 3 of which were clearly equally weighed and balanced at the center, 3 of 
which were clearly unevenly weighed and balanced towards one end were used for a final 
sorting task in the Geometric Center condition. 
Procedure.  The procedure was identical to Experiment 1, with one exception.  
After the final prediction at the end of the experiment, children in the Geometric Center 
condition were asked to sort the six new colored blocks into two piles: blocks that had a 
heavier side and blocks that were equally heavy on both sides.  Children were then asked 
to sort the test block.  This allowed us to make sure that children had not discovered the 
surreptitious weighting during play and continued to believe that the block was heavier 
on the larger side (like the block in the Center of Mass condition). All children ‘passed’ 
the final sort (i.e., failed to discover that the surreptitiously weighted block was actually 
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evenly weighted); that is, they sorted the test block with the other objects that were 
heavier towards the larger side.    
Results  
There were no age differences between groups (t(30) =-.85, p = ns). Children’s 
initial prediction results were coded as in Experiment 1 and 2; as stated above, only 
children balancing the block at the geometric center on all three classification trials were 
included (78%). Children’s initial predictions were coded by a research assistant blind to 
hypotheses and conditions and 88% of the clips were reliability coded by a second 
researcher also blind to hypothesis and condition; reliability was high (98% agreement10).  
Play.  Replicating the results of Experiment 1, Center Theorists were more likely 
to explore the balancing block when the evidence conflicted with their beliefs than when 
it confirmed their beliefs. We ran a two-way-between subjects ANOVA on playtime with 
type of evidence as the between subjects variables and time spent playing with the blocks 
and novel toy as the dependent measures. Comparisons between conditions revealed no 
main effect of condition (children in the Geometric Center condition played as long as 
children in the Center of Mass condition), and no main effect of toy type (averaging 
across conditions, children played as long on average with the blocks as with the novel 
toy). However, comparisons revealed a significant interaction, (F(1, 60) = 11.43, p < 
.01); children spent more time playing with the block over the novel toy when evidence 
conflicted with beliefs than when evidence was consistent with beliefs. Children in the 
Geometric Center condition played longer with the novel toy than the balancing block 
(t(15) = 1.89, p < .05), while children the Center of Mass condition played significantly 
longer with the balancing block than the novel toy (t(15) =1.83, p < .05). See Figure 2(b) 
and Table 4. 
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Explanations.  Children’s explanations were coded as in Experiment 1.  One 
child in the Center of Mass condition refused to provide an explanation. Although there 
was no magnet present in the block at the point of balance, one child in the Center of 
Mass condition spontaneously explained that the block stayed up because of a magnet. 
For the reported analyses below, these children were coded as providing an 
“Uninformative” explanation.  The remaining children fell uniquely and unambiguously 
into the Mass consistent, Center consistent, or Uninformative categories.  There was a 
marginally significant effect of condition on explanation: more children in the Center of 
Mass condition appealed to a Mass consistent explanation following play (50%) than did 
children in Geometric Center condition (19%); in contrast, more children made Center 
consistent explanations in the Geometric Center condition (31%) than the Center of Mass 
condition (6%) (Fishers Exact (N = 32), p = .07).  There were no differences between 
conditions with respect to Uninformative explanations (Geometric: 50%; Mass: 44%); 
see Table 4. 
Final Predictions.  As in Experiment 1, children’s final balance attempts were 
coded as either Mass consistent, Center consistent, or Other.  The majority (63%) of 
Center Theorists in the Center of Mass condition changed their final prediction to a Mass 
consistent prediction.  In sharp contrast, no child in the Geometric Center condition 
changed his or her predictions on the final balance; all children made a Center Belief 
consistent prediction.  Significantly more children changed predictions on the final 
balance attempt after observing conflicting evidence than confirming evidence, (Fisher 
Exact (N = 32), p < .001).   Following the conflicting evidence, the majority of children 
who made a Mass consistent final prediction also made a Mass consistent explanation (7 
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of 10 children), while only 1 of the 6 children who made a Center consistent final 
prediction gave a Mass explanation (Fisher exact (N = 16), p = .06); see Table 4. 
 Given that the Center Theorists in the Center of Mass condition observed 
evidence counter to their beliefs and those in the Geometric Center condition did not, it is 
perhaps unsurprising that children in the Center of Mass condition changed their final 
predictions and those in the Geometric Center condition did not.  However, it is 
interesting to compare the Center Theorists in the Center of Mass condition of 
Experiment 3 with those in Experiment 1.  In Experiment 1, eight Center Theorists in the 
Center of Mass condition generated evidence (in free play) that they could not explain 
away (i.e., they tried to balance the block over the geometric center and failed because 
the magnet was located under the center of mass); 75% of these children made mass 
consistent final predictions, comparable to the 63% of Center Theorists in the Center of 
Mass condition of Experiment 3 who also observed evidence they could not explain away 
(Fisher Exact = ns).  By contrast, eight Center Theorists in the Center of Mass condition 
of Experiment 1 observed only evidence that they could explain away (with the magnet); 
none of these children made a Mass consistent final prediction.  Comparing the Center 
Theorists who could explain away the data (the 8 children from Experiment 1 and 16 
from Experiment 3) with those who could not (8 children in Experiment 1), suggests that 
children were more likely to change their final balance in response to the data in the 
absence of a potentially explanatory auxiliary variable (Fisher Exact (N = 32), p < .01). 
Discussion  
 Experiment 3 replicated the finding that, given identical evidence, children’s prior 
beliefs mediate their pattern of exploratory play: children were more likely to explore the 
familiar balance when evidence was surprising with respect to their prior beliefs than 
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when it was consistent with them.  Additionally, both children’s explanations and their 
final predictions support the claim that children generalized from the evidence they 
generated in exploratory play.  Taken together, the Center Theorists’ patterns of 
responding in Experiment 1 and Experiment 3 suggest a dynamic relationship between 
prior beliefs, the presence of auxiliary variables, and learning. When an auxiliary variable 
was present, Center Theorists who observed belief-violating evidence were just as 
resistant to changing their beliefs as Center Theorists who observed only belief-consistent 
evidence. However, when no auxiliary variables were available to explain away the 
surprising evidence, Center Theorists produced mass consistent explanations and mass 
consistent final predictions. These results suggest that young children respond rationally 
to anomalous evidence they observe during play; they explain it away when they can and 
revise their predictions when they cannot. 
General Discussion 
 We began by considering the metaphor of the “child as scientist”.  We suggested 
that children’s folk theories should play a critical role not only in supporting their causal 
judgments but also in guiding their exploratory behavior and their tendency to learn from 
or explain away theory-violating evidence.  Consistent with this idea, we found that 
children’s prior beliefs mediate their exploratory play; children were more likely to 
explore the familiar balance when they observed evidence that conflicted with their prior 
beliefs than when they were presented with belief-consistent evidence or when they 
lacked strong differential beliefs. We also found that children selectively appealed to 
auxiliary hypotheses to explain away evidence that conflicted with their prior beliefs.  
Finally we showed that children were more likely to learn from theory-violating data 
when a potentially explanatory auxiliary variable was absent than when it was present. 
BALANCING THEORIES   
 
33
Taken together, these results suggest that children’s learning is at once conservative and 
flexible; children integrate evidence, prior beliefs, and competing causal hypotheses in 
their exploration, explanation, and learning.  
 In these respects, the current study is consistent with other recent research 
suggesting that children selectively explore and seek to explain belief-violating evidence 
(e.g., Legare et al., in press).  In contrast to previous studies however, this study extends 
beyond investigation of novel, arbitrary causal relationships (e.g., i.e., blocks that activate 
toys) to look at children’s real world beliefs. Strikingly, children quite close in age, given 
identical task instructions, looking at identical evidence, can interpret it differently and 
thus exhibit different patterns of both exploration and explanation.   
 Moreover, although many studies suggest that children try to explain away 
evidence that violates their prior beliefs, and will even invoke unobserved variables to do 
so (Bullock et al., 1982; Legare et al., in press; Koslowski, 1996; Kuhn, 1989; Kushnir & 
Gopnik, 2007; Schulz, Goodman, Tenenbaum, & Jenkins, 2008; Schulz & Sommerville, 
2006; Sobel, Yoachim, Gopnik, Meltzoff, & Blumenthal, 2007), to our knowledge, this 
study is the first to show that children’s ability to learn from theory-violating evidence 
trades-off with the accessibility of auxiliary variables.  Children were much more likely 
to revise their predictions when unexpected evidence could not be easily accounted for 
than when it could.  Additionally, while other studies suggest that children appeal to 
auxiliary variables when evidence violates their prior beliefs, this study shows that they 
do so even when auxiliary variables are uniformly good explanations for the observed 
evidence. (Magnets after all, can explain why objects stay up even in expected locations.)  
Future research might investigate general principles illustrating how prior belief in a 
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theory, the strength of the anomalous evidence, and the availability of alternative 
hypotheses interact to affect children’s responses to belief-violating evidence.   
A learner might experience uncertainty and choose to explore for different 
reasons: because the observed evidence fails to distinguish plausible causal hypotheses or 
because the observed evidence violates the learner’s prior beliefs.  Bayesian inference 
offers an account of curiosity in which both these cases of uncertainty are due to a 
common inferential process: the integration of the learner’s prior beliefs in the probability 
of the hypotheses (the prior) and the probability that the learner would observe the 
evidence if the hypothesis were true (the likelihood).  Previous studies showed that 
children selectively explored evidence when the priors and likelihoods of competing 
hypotheses were roughly equivalent (Cook et al., 2011; Gweon & Schulz, 2008; Schulz 
& Bonawitz, 2007); the current work extends these ideas by showing that children engage 
in selective exploration when the prior probability of one hypothesis is higher, but its 
likelihood is lower, than another.    
A complete understanding of the relationship between theory development, 
exploratory play, and theory change remains a challenge to the field. However, this work 
suggests that belief guided exploration may play an important role in helping children 
generate evidence to support causal learning.  Insofar as exploration can lead to the 
discovery of potentially explanatory hidden variables, it might help children rationally 
maintain their beliefs in the face of spurious counter-evidence.  Insofar as exploration can 
reveal new, unexplained, and previously unexpected causal relationships, it might support 
belief revision.   Thus, in looking at how children investigate mass and balance in the 
physical world, we may also learn something about how children weigh evidence and 
balance it against their prior beliefs in everyday learning.  
BALANCING THEORIES   
 
35




Special thanks to the participating daycares in Cambridge, MA, to the Museum of 
Science, Boston, and the Boston Children’s Museum, to Suejean Lim for substantial 
contributions to data-collection, coding, and discussion, and to Irene Headen, Yunji Wu, 
Noah Goodman, Darlene Ferranti, Swe Tun, Si Wang, Meekerley Sanon, and members of 
the Early Childhood Cognition Lab. This research was additionally supported by an 
American Psychological Foundation Koppitz Fellowship to E. B., a John S. Templeton 
Foundation award and an NSF Faculty Early Career Development Award to L. S., and a 
James S. McDonnell Foundation Collaborative Interdisciplinary Grant on Causal 









Baillargeon, R. & Hanko-Summers, S. (1990). Is the top object adequately supported by 
the bottom object? Young infants' understanding of support relations. Cognitive 
Development, 5, 29-53. 
Berlyne, D. (1969). Conflict, arousal and curiosity. New York: McGraw-Hill 
Bjorklund, D. F., & Brown, R. D. (1998).  Physical play and cognitive development: 
Integrating activity, cognition, and education.  Child Development, 69(3), 604-
606. 
Bruner, J., Jolly, A., & Sylva, K. (1976). Play – Its Role in Development and Evolution. 
New York: Basic Books, Inc.  
Bullock, M., Gelman, R., & Baillargeon, R. (1982). The development of causal 
reasoning. In W. J. Friedman (Ed.), The Developmental Psychology of Time (pp. 
209-254). New York, NY: Academic Press. 
Carey, S. (1985). Conceptual change in childhood. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press/Bradford 
Books. 
Carey, S. (2009). The Origin of Concepts. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Case, R. (1985). Intellectual development: Birth to adulthood. London: Academic Press. 
Chen, Z. & Klahr, D. (1999). All other things being equal: Acquisition and transfer of the 
control of variables strategy. Child Development, 70(5), 1098-1120.  
Cook, C., Goodman, N., & Schulz, L. E. (2011). Where science starts: Spontaneous 
experiments in preschoolers' exploratory play. Cognition, 120(3), 341-349. 
Cooper, W. H.  (1981).  Ubiquitous halo.  Psychological Bulletin, 90(2), 218-244. 
Dunbar, K. & Klahr, D. (1989). Developmental differences in scientific discovery 
processes. In D. Klahr and K. Kotovsky (Eds.), The 21st Carnegie-Mellon 
BALANCING THEORIES   
 
38
Symposium on Cognition: Complex Information Processing: The Impact of 
Herbert A. Simon. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. 
Goodman, N., Tenenbaum, J., Feldman, J., & Griffiths, T. L. (2008). A rational analysis 
of rule-based concept learning. Cognitive Science, 32(1), 108-154.  
Gopnik, A., Glymour, C., Sobel, D., Schulz, L. E., Kushnir, T., & Danks, D. (2004). A 
theory of causal learning in children: causal maps and Bayes nets. Psychological 
Review, 111(1), 1-31. 
Gopnik, A., & Meltzoff, A. (1997). Words, thoughts and theories. Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press. 
Griffiths, T. L., & Tenenbaum, J. B. (2009). Theory-based causal induction. 
Psychological Review, 116(4), 661-716. 
Gruen, G. E., & Weird, M. W.  (1964).  Effect of instructions, penalty, and age on 
probability learning.  Child Development, 35(1), 265-273. 
Gweon, H. & Schulz, L.E. (2008). Stretching to learn: Ambiguous evidence and 
variability in preschoolers’ exploratory play. Proceedings of the 30th Annual 
Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, 570-574. 
Halford, G.S., Andrews, G., Dalton, C., Boag, C., & Zielinski, T. (2002). Young 
children’s performance on the balance scale: The influence of relational 
complexity. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 81, 417-445. 
Hastie, R., & Kumar, P. A. (1979). Person memory: personality traits as organizing 
principles in memory for behaviors. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 37(1), 25–38. 
Hutt, C., & Bhavnani, R. (1972). Predictions from play. Nature, 237, 171–172. 
BALANCING THEORIES   
 
39
Inhelder, B. & Piaget, J. (1958). The growth of logical thinking from childhood to 
adolescence. New York: Basic Books. 
Jansen, B. R. J., & van der Maas, H. L. J. (2002). The development of children’s rule use 
on the balance scale task. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 81, 383-
416. 
Karmiloff-Smith, A., & Inhelder, B. (1974). If you want to get ahead, get a theory. 
Cognition, 3(3), 195-212. 
Klahr, D., & Nigam, M. (2004). The equivalence of learning paths in early science 
instruction: Effects of direct instruction and discovery learning. Psychological 
Science, 15, 661-667. 
Kording, K., & Wolpert, D. M. (2004). Bayesian integration in sensorimotor learning. 
Nature, 427, 244-247.  
Koslowski, B. (1996). Theory and Evidence: The Development of Scientific Reasoning. 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Kuhn, D. (1989). Children and adults as intuitive scientists. Psychological Review, 96(4), 
674-689. 
Kuhn, D., Amsel, E., & O'Laughlin, M. (1988). The development of scientific thinking 
skills. Orlando, FL: Academic Press. 
Kushnir, T., & Gopnik, A. (2007). Conditional probability versus spatial contiguity in 
causal learning: Preschoolers use new contingency evidence to overcome prior 
spatial assumptions. Developmental Psychology, 44, 186-196. 
Kushnir, T., Xu, F. & Wellman, H. M. (in press).  Young children use statistical sampling 
to infer the preferences of others. Psychological Science. 
BALANCING THEORIES   
 
40
Legare, C. H., Gelman, S. A., & Wellman, H. M.  (in press). Inconsistency with prior 
knowledge triggers children's causal explanatory reasoning. Child Development. 
Lord, C. G., Ross, L., & Lepper, M. R.  (1979).  Biased assimilation and attitude 
polarization: The effects of prior theories on subsequently considered evidence.  
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 37(11), 2098-2109. 
Masnick, A. M., & Klahr, D. (2003). Error Matters: An initial exploration of elementary 
school children's understanding of experimental error. Journal of Cognition and 
Development, 4(1), 67-98. 
McClelland, J. L. (1989). Parallel distributed processing: Implications for cognition and 
development. In R. G. M. Morris (Ed.), Parallel distributed processing: 
Implications for psychology and neurobiology (pp. 8-45). Oxford, UK: Oxford 
University Press. 
McClelland, J. L. (1995). A connectionist perspective on knowledge and development. In 
T. J. Simon & G. S. Halford (Eds.), Developing cognitive competence: New 
approaches to process modeling (pp. 157–204). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates. 
Messer, D. J., Mohamedali, M., & Fletcher, B. (1996). Using computers to help pupils 
tell the time: Is feedback necessary? Educational Psychology, 16(3), 281-296.  
Messer, D. J., Norgate, S., Joiner, R., Littleton, K., & Light, P. (1996). Development 
without learning? Educational Psychology, 16(1), 5-19. 
Murphy, G., & Medin, D. (1985). The role of theories in conceptual coherence.  
Psychological Review, 92, 289-316. 
Needham, A. & Baillargeon, R. (1993). Intuitions about support in 4.5-month-old 
infants.  Cognition, 47, 121-148 
BALANCING THEORIES   
 
41
Nickerson, R. S. (1998). Confirmation bias: A ubiquitous phenomenon in many guises. 
Review of Genetic Psychology, 2(22), 175-220. 
Normandeau, S., Larivee, S., Roulin, J., & Longeot, F. (1989). The balance scale 
dilemma: Either the subject or the experimenter muddles through. Journal of 
Genetic Psychology, 150(3), 237–250. 
Piaget, J. (1962). Play, dreams and imitation in childhood. New York: Norton. 
Pine, K. J., & Messer, D. J. (2000). The effect of explaining another’s actions on 
children’s implicity theories of balance.  Cognition and Instruction, 18(1), 35-51. 
Power, T. G. (2000). Play and exploration in children and animals. Mahwah, NJ: 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. 
Raijmakers, M. E. J., van Koten, S., & Molenaar, P. C. M. (1996). On the validity of 
simulating stagewise development by means of PDP Networks: Application of 
catastrophe analysis and an experimental test of rule-like behavior. Cognitive 
Science, 20(1), 101-136. 
Rubin, K. H., Fein, G. G. & Vandenberg, B. (1983). Play. In E. M. Hetherington (Ed.), P. 
H. Mussen (Series Ed.), Handbook of child psychology: Vol. 4. Socialization, 
personality, and social development (pp. 693-774). New York: John Wiley & 
Sons. 
Saxe, R., Tenenbaum, J. B., & Carey, S. (2005).  Secret agents: Inferences about hidden 
causes by 10- and 12-month-old infants.  Psychological Science, 16(12), 995-
1001.  
Schauble, L. (1990).  Belief revision in children: The role of prior knowledge and 
strategies for generating evidence.  Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 
49, 31-57. 
BALANCING THEORIES   
 
42
Schulz, L. E., & Bonawitz, E. B. (2007). Serious fun: Preschoolers play more when 
evidence is confounded. Developmental Psychology, 43(4), 1045-1050. 
Schulz, L. E., Bonawitz, E. B., & Griffiths, T. (2007). Can being scared cause tummy 
aches? Naïve theories, ambiguous evidence and preschoolers’ causal inferences. 
Developmental Psychology, 43(5), 1124-1139. 
Schulz, L. E., Goodman, N. D., Tenenbaum, J. B., & Jenkins, C. A. (2008). Going 
beyond the evidence: Abstract laws and preschoolers' responses to anomalous 
data. Cognition, 109(2), 211-223. 
Schulz, L. E. & Gopnik, A. (2004). Causal learning across domains. Developmental 
Psychology, 40(2), 162-176. 
Schulz, L. E., Gopnik, A., & Glymore, C. (2007). Preschool children learn about causal 
structure from conditional interventions. Developmental Science, 10(3), 322-332. 
Schulz, L. E. & Sommerville, J. (2006). God does not play dice: Causal determinism and 
children's inferences about unobserved causes. Child Development, 77(2), 427-
442.  
Shultz, T. (1982). Rules of causal attribution. Monographs of the Society for Research in 
Child Development, 47(1).  
Shultz, T. R., & Takane, Y. (2007). Rule following and rule use in simulations of the 
balance-scale task. Cognition, 103(3), 460-472. 
Siegler, R.S. (1976). Three aspects of cognitive development. Cognitive Psychology, 8, 
481-520. 
Siegler, R. S., & Chen, Z. (1998). Developmental differences in rule learning: A 
microgenetic analysis. Cognitive Psychology 36(3), 273–310.  
BALANCING THEORIES   
 
43
Siegler, R. S., & Chen, Z. (2002). Development of rules and strategies: Balancing the old 
and the new. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 81(4), 446-457. 
Singer, D. G. , Golinkoff, M. R., & Hirsh-Pasek, K. (2006). Play = Learning: How play 
motivates and enhances children's cognitive and social-emotional growth.  New 
York: Oxford University Press.  
Sloutsky, V. M., & Spino, M. A. (2004). Naive theory and transfer of learning: When less 
is more and more is less. Psychonomic Bulletin and Review, 11(3), 528-535. 
Sobel, D. M., & Munro, S. A. (2009). Domain generality and specificity in children’s 
causal inferences about ambiguous data. Developmental Psychology, 45, 511-524. 
Sobel, D. M., Tenenbaum, J. B., & Gopnik, A. (2004). Children's causal inferences from 
indirect evidence: Backwards blocking and Bayesian reasoning in preschoolers. 
Cognitive Science, 28(3), 303-333. 
Sobel, D. M., Yoachim, C. M., Gopnik, A., Meltzoff, A. N., & Blumenthal, E. J. (2007). 
The blicket within: Preschoolers’ inferences about insides and causes. Journal of 
Cognition and Development, 8, 159-182. 
Sodian, B., Zaitchik, D., & Carey, S. (1991). Young children's differentiation of 
hypothetical beliefs from evidence. Child Development, 62, 753-766. 
Weir, M. W. and Stevenson, H. W.  (1959).  The Effect of Verbalization in Children’s 
Learning as a Function of Chronological Age.  Child Development, 30(1), 143-
149. 
Wason, P. C. (1960). On the failure to eliminate hypotheses in a conceptual task. 
Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 12, 129–140. 
Weir, M. W.  (1964).  Effect of Patterned Partial Reinforcement on Children’s 
Performance in a Two-Choice Task.  Child Development, 35(1), 257-264.  
BALANCING THEORIES   
 
44
Weiss, Y., Simoncelli, E. P., & Adelson,  E. H. (2002). Motion illusions as optimal 
percepts. Nature Neuroscience, 5(6), 598-604.  
Wellman, H., & Gelman, S. (1992). Cognitive development: Foundational theories of 
core domains.  Annual Review of Psychology, 43, 337-375. 
Wright, J. C., & Murphy, G. L.  (1984).  The utility of theories in intuitive statistics: The 
robustness of theory-based judgments.  Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
General, 113(2), 301-322. 
Xu, F., & Tenenbaum, J. B. (2007). Word learning as Bayesian inference. Psychological 
Review, 114(2), 245-272.  





Results from Experiment 1 
Seconds of play, percent explanations and final predictions of four and five-year-old “No 
Theory” children in the Geometric Center and Center of Mass conditions.  
 Geometric Center 
(n = 16) 
Center of Mass 
(n = 15) 
Block 14.3s (13.8) 13.4s (15.7) Play 
Novel Toy 25.7s (13.4) 26.2s (18.6) 
Other 56 47 
Center-consistent 0 7 
Mass-consistent 13 20 
Explanations 
Magnet 31 27 
Other 0 7 
Center-consistent 94 67 
Final Predictions 
Mass-consistent 6 27 




Results from Experiment 1 
Seconds of play, percent explanations and final predictions of Center and Mass Theorists 
in the Geometric Center and Center of Mass conditions. 







Center of Mass  
(n=14) 
Block 23.8 (19.0) 33.4 (15.9) 38.0 (16.1) 25.0 (20.2) Play 
Novel Toy 30.1 (19.5) 15.1 (16.0) 21.1 (13.2) 29.9 (19.6) 
Other 19 6 0 14 
Center  13 6 0 0 
Mass  19 31 29 71 
Explanations 
Magnet 50 56 71 14 
Other 0 0 7 0 
Center 100 63 29 7 
Final 
Predictions 
Mass 0 38 64 93 
Note. Standard Deviation in parentheses. 





Table 3  
Results from Experiment 2 
Percentages of explanations and sorting responses of Center Theorists in the Geometric 
Center and Center of Weight conditions; (a n = 14). 
 Explanations Sorting 
Condition Magnet Center Mass Other Magnetic Non-magnetic 
Geometric Center 
n = 16  
19 50 6 25 36a 64a 
Center of Weight 
n = 16  





Results from Experiment 3 
Seconds of play, percent explanations and final predictions of Center Theorists in the 
Geometric Center and Center of Mass conditions.  
  Geometric Center 
(n = 16) 
Center of Mass 
(n = 16) 
Block 17.5 (17.9) 33.8 (15.2) Play 
Novel Toy 32.1 (17.1) 19.9 (17.0) 
Other 50 38 
Center-consistent 31 6 
Mass-consistent 19 50 
Explanations 
Magnet 0 6 
Other 0 0 
Center-consistent 100 38 
Final Predictions 
Mass-consistent 0 63 
Note. Standard Deviation in parentheses. 





Figure 1. Method for Experiments 1 and 3.  
 
Figure 2.  (a) Play results for Center Theorists and Mass Theorists in Experiment 1. (b) 
Play results for Center Theorist in Experiment 3. 
 
Figure 3. (a) Distribution of Explanations in Experiment 1: Center Theorists were equally 
likely to invoke the magnet in both conditions; Mass Theorists were more likely to 
invoke the magnet given theory-violating than theory-consistent evidence. (b) 
Distribution of Explanations by Center Theorists in Experiment 2: children were more 
likely to invoke the magnet given theory-violating than theory-consistent evidence. 
